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A commentary on
Who can you trust? Behavioral and neu-
ral  differences  between  perceptual  and 
  memory-based influences
by John D. Rudoy and Ken A. Paller.
Can  we  help  but  “judge  a  book  by  its 
cover?”  Recent  neural  evidence  suggests 
that  we  do  this  fairly  quickly  and  per-
haps without even realizing it. As Rudoy 
and Paller (2009) recently demonstrated, 
people  judge  the  trustworthiness  of  a 
stranger’s  face  with  dual  pathways.  One 
pathway  quickly  processes  the  physical 
characteristics of the face, while a second, 
slower pathway processes information that 
has been learned about the owner of the 
face. These data contribute to a growing 
literature on the neural basis of trustwor-
thiness judgments. Much like judgments of 
attractiveness, judgments of trustworthi-
ness happen especially quickly compared to 
other trait judgments and occur even when 
people are not explicitly asked to evalu-
ate trustworthiness (Winston et al., 2002; 
Willis and Todorov, 2006). Together, these 
findings raise a number of questions about 
the “dual nature” of the neural pathways 
that contribute to trustworthy judgments, 
and how these pathways are modulated by 
socioemotional contexts.
Rudoy and Paller (2009) show that “per-
ceptual” information (i.e., pictures of faces) 
is processed more quickly than “memory-
based” information (i.e., personality traits) 
when making judgments of trustworthiness 
from a face. In their two studies, they pre-
sented participants with faces that varied in 
stereotypical trustworthiness. Stereotypical 
trustworthiness reflects the extent to which 
most people perceive the face to be trust-
worthy  (it  does  not  necessarily  predict 
actual  trustworthiness:  Zebrowitz  et al., 
1996). The faces were paired with either 
positive personality trait words or negative 
personality trait words. Participants then 
saw the faces again without the words and 
had  to  judge  their  trustworthiness.  One 
study required participants to make these 
judgments with or without a time limit. 
When under a time limit, participants’ judg-
ments of trustworthiness varied less across 
faces that had been paired with negative, 
compared  to  positive,  personality  traits. 
However, the time limit did not affect the 
relation between physical appearance and 
trustworthiness judgments. A second study 
found  that  variance  in  the  stereotypical 
trustworthiness of a face elicited different 
amplitudes  of  the  ERPs  from  the  ante-
rior frontal midline location (Fpz) within 
200–400 ms. The valence of the paired word 
was  associated  with  different  amplitudes 
of parietal ERPs at 800–1000 ms. Together, 
these findings suggest that perceptual infor-
mation and memory-based information are 
processed at different rates and by different 
neural systems. These findings represent a 
new approach to thinking about the dual 
processes and pathways that contribute to 
trustworthiness  judgments.  For  example, 
previous research has focused on neural dis-
tinctions that differentiated trustworthiness 
judgments depending on whether a person 
consciously intends to evaluate trustworthi-
ness from a face (Winston et al. 2002).
What  might  dual  processes  character-
ized by differences in timing and content 
imply about how trustworthiness is judged? 
General models of judgment suggest that, in 
the interest of efficiency, faster information 
exerts more influence on final judgments, 
unless there are strong reasons to incorpo-
rate slower information (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). Does the faster process-
ing of perceptual information mean that it 
has a stronger influence than memory-based 
information on final judgments of trust-
worthiness? Intriguingly, previous research 
shows that people’s judgments of the trust-
worthiness of a face are significantly formed 
after seeing the face for only 100 ms (Willis 
and Todorov, 2006). Even when given more 
time,  people  do  not  significantly  change 
their ratings of trustworthiness, although 
they  may  feel  more  confident  in  their 
  judgments (Willis and Todorov, 2006). So 
is this evidence that people are slaves to their 
first impressions when judging trustworthi-
ness? Not necessarily – these studies have 
only examined trustworthiness judgments 
based on faces and have not manipulated 
memory-based information. Therefore, it 
remains  unknown  whether  trustworthi-
ness judgments are relatively cemented by 
100 ms, when both facial information and 
learned  information  are  available  to  be 
processed. Furthermore, Rudoy and Paller’s 
(2009) study shows that some people prefer 
to use facial information, while others are 
more likely to draw on the personality trait 
information when judging trustworthiness. 
Therefore, it may not be the rate of informa-
tion processing that determines trustwor-
thiness judgments. Instead, future research 
may find that an individual difference that 
predicts preferences for heuristic compared 
to deliberative processing is a more powerful 
predictor of trusthworthiness judgments.
Another  fruitful  next  step  for  neural 
research on judgments of trustworthiness 
is to examine how neural processing of dif-
ferent kinds of information is modulated by 
socioemotional contexts. For example, one 
implication of Rudoy and Paller’s (2009) 
findings  is  that  the  neural  regions  that 
represent physical characteristics of a face 
are more quickly engaged for judgments 
of trustworthiness than the neural regions 
that represent learned information. Is this 
the case or does it depend on the perceptual 
salience  of  physical  characteristics?  One 
can imagine real-world judgments, where 
information rather than physical features 
are more salient. For example, hiring deci-
sions may be made on the basis of salient 
paperwork (e.g., resumes) and memories of 
a person’s face during a previous interview. 
In such a case, would the stereotypical trust-
worthiness of the face still influence judg-
ments in the same manner and show the 
same rapid neural signature?Beer	et	al.	 Neural	architecture	of	trustworthiness	judgments
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A further question is: how familiarity 
affects  judgments  of  trustworthiness? 
In  other  realms  of  social  perception, 
familiarity  modulates  both  neural  and 
  information-processing.  For  example, 
there  are  neural  distinctions  for  mak-
ing  inferences  about  well-known  others 
(compared  to  strangers),  and  for  mak-
ing  inferences  about  strangers  who  are 
similar  to  the  self  (compared  to  those 
who are dissimilar) (Mitchell et al., 2006; 
Vanderwal et al., 2008). Additionally, peo-
ple can more quickly access abstract trait 
information about other people who are 
close to them (when compared to people 
they know less well) (Klein et al., 1992). 
How  does  familiarity  affect  the  neural 
and information-processing that contrib-
ute to trustworthiness judgments? It may 
be that the greater accessibility of learned 
information for familiar others affects the 
relative timing or engagement of pathways, 
which  process  “perceptual”  and  “mem-
ory-based” information for trustworthi-
ness  judgments.  Future  research  might 
manipulate familiarity by including faces 
of  well-known  others  and  strangers,  or 
faces of ingroup and outgroup members.
Rudoy and Paller (2009) contribute to a 
growing body of research that sets the stage 
for  how  perceptual  and  memory-based 
information may be processed differently for 
trustworthiness  judgments.  This  research 
suggests that, like so many other judgments, 
both heuristic and deliberative processing 
contribute  to  trustworthiness  judgments. 
Our understanding of the neural basis of 
these dual processes will be deepened by 
future research examining these processes 
across different socioemotional contexts.
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